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Abstract : In this paper, we proposed an identification and data encrypt key manage protocol 
that can be used in some security system based on such secure devices as secure USB 
memories or RFIDs, which are widely used for identifying persons or other objects 
recently. In general, the default functions of the security system using a mobile device 
are the authentication for the owner of the device and secure storage of data stored on 
the device. 
We proposed a security model that consists of the server and mobile devices in order to 
realize these security features. In this model we defined the secure communication 
protocol for the authentication and management of data encryption keys using a private 
key encryption algorithm with the public key between the server and mobile devices. In 
addition, we was performed the analysis for the attack to the communication protocol 
between the mobile device and server.  
Using the communication protocol, the system will attempt to authenticate the mobile 
device. The data decrypt key is transmitted only if the authentication process is 
successful. The data in the mobile device can be decrypted using the key. 
Our analysis proved that this Protocol ensures anonymity, prevents replay attacks and 
realizes the interactive identification between the security devices and the authentication 
server. 
Keywords: security, user authentication, identification protocol, data encrypt key, secure 
USB 
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1. Introduction 
 
Massive use of mobile storage media raises data security and user authentication problem 
seriously. 
Reliability of security system should not be based on system mechanism or complexity of 
system analysis, and it should guarantee safety even if system mechanism or encryption algorithm 
is opened to third party. 
In the paper, we proposed an identification and data encrypt key manage protocol for using in 
some user authentication and dik encrypt system based on such secure devices as secure USB 
memories or RFIDs. 
 We analyze security problems of existing disk encryption methods and identification protocol 
in section 2 and describe our identification protocol and data encrypt key manage protocol, in 
section 3. In section 4, we analyze some security performance of our system. 
 
 
2. Previous Works 
 
Nowadays, there are a lot of security system that are using such storage devices being capable 
of storing personal data securely as secure USB, smart card or RFIDs. 
Several different methods for disk encryption, such as LoopAES, EFS, TrueCrypt, NCryptfs, 
were suggested [ 5, 6, 8, 9, 10].  
In these methods, encryption of disk block is expressed as follows.  
 C=OP(BE(OP(P, DEK, i), DEK), DEK, i)    (1)  
 Here, BE is a block encryption function (AES, 3DES, etc.), OP is an operation function (CBC, 
LRW, XTS, etc.), DEK is a disk encryption key, P is a plaintext, i is a block index and C is a cipher 
text.  
As expression (1) shows, these disk encryption systems encrypt plaintext using symmetric-key 
algorithm through certain operation and apply this operation again to encrypted result.  
These disk encryption methods have some weakness in terms of time passage and space 
expansion. 
- Temporal limitation  
If third party succeeds to detect encryption key of a certain sector, data which is stored in 
this sector later can be decoded.  
- Spatial limitation  
If third party succeeds to detect encryption key of a certain block, whole data of disk is in 
danger of being decoded.  
 
GBDE based encryption method which was implemented in FreeBSD overcame these temporal 
and spatial limitations to a certain extent [7].  
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Although GBDE based disk encryption method overcomes temporal and spatial limitations of 
previous disk encryption methods considerably, it still has some security problems to be solved.  
- Key-key for a given sector is fixed because it is decided depending on the sector address. That is, 
when it was written new data on sector, sector key is encrypted by same key-key. 
- It is easy to get keychain used to encrypt plaintext data, if the correlation between random data 
generated consecutively by PRNG is revealed, because it directly uses random data generated by 
PRNG as key for plaintext. 
 
the SDMS Encrypt Method in [1] solved temporal limitation problem and spatial limitation 
problem of data encryption to a certain extent. 
And, SDMS can control security performance flexibly according to the security requirements.  
The master data encrypt key DEK in SDMS must be encrypted based on the user authentication 
information. However, it did not propose a specific Authentication protocol.  
There are also a lot of authentication protocols that are using mobile devices to identify the 
identity of their users [2-4]. But there are many protocols that have various volunerabilities or not to 
be satisfied the requirements for applications.  
For example, the protocols in [2, 3] expose the device's ID, or cannot to be clear the 
requirements of anonymity and resistence for device traceability because of using fixed hash value 
for each device, and the protocols in [4] have the problem that the load of authentication servers are 
rapidly increasing as the number of devices grows. 
In the next section, we present a user identification and data encrypt key manage protocol. 
 
 
3. Our Identification and Data Encrypt Key Management Protocol 
 
In this paper, the authentication system consists of the secure storage devices being capable of 
storing the legitimate user’s ID and having some cryptographic computation capability such as 
secure USB memories, smart cards or RFIDs, the authentication server that maintains the IDs of 
all legitimate users on their internal database and confirms the existence of the specific user’s ID in 
the ID database responding to authentication requests, and the brokers which are placed between 
the secure devices and authentication server and transmit any messages of them (for example, the 
use authentication software on the computer that the secure devices are connected).  
 
 3.1 Notations 
 
D :  A specific (security) device 
DID :  The ID of the device D  (namely, the ID of the legistimate device 
owner that the system has to identify) 
Dr :  The random number generated by the authentication server and 
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stored in the device D . 
Hello :  The ID query message that the broker send to the secure storage 
device. 
hH }1,0{}1,0{: *  :  The h-bit cryptographic hash function that have the preimage 
resistence and the collision resistence cryptographic hash function 
( h  is a positive integer) 
PRNG :  The pseudo-random generator implemented in the authentication 
server. We suppose that the bit length of random number generated 
by it cannot be beyond the one of hash value of H  ( h ). 
),,( PPP DEKeyGenPKE  :  The secure public-key cryptosystems implemented in the 
authentication server and secure storage devices.  
),( PP de :  The pair of public and private key of PKE , generated by 
PKeyGen . It assumes that the decryption key (the private key) is 
only known to the authentication server. 
),,( SSS DEKeyGenSKE  :  The secure symmetric-key cryptosystems implemented in the 
authentication server and secure storage devices. 
PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dkLen):  The key derive function defined in the PKCD#5 v2.0 [11]. 
 
 
3.2 The Structure of Secure Storage Device's Signature 
 
This secure storage device's signature DSig  consists of DID  and key for the secure storage 
devices D .  
Here, DID  is the unique random number for the device D , and key is the encrypt/decrypt key 
for data in the device D . 
All signature DSig for any secure storage devices D  are stored in the authentication server. 
The structure of signature DSig  in the server is as follows: 
 
Figure. Structure of signature DSig  
 
3.3 Our Identification and Key Management Protocol 
 
Our protocol consists of the preparation step and the authentication step. 
 
[ The Preparation Step] 
Any secure storage device registered in the authentication system, D  are maintained the 
random number Dr  generated by the authentication server. The random number Dr  is unique for 
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the device D , so it differs by devices. The authentication server must maintain the random numbers 
in some period for resisting the replay attacks and guarantee their uniqueness. It stores all 
signature DSig  for any secure storage devices D  in the system to its secure internal database by 
making )( DIDH  as the search primary key. 
 
[The Authentication Step] 
Step 1 : The broker initiats the protocol run by sending the message Hello  to the device D . 
Step 2 : The device D  run the following actions by using its ID, DID and the random number 
Dr  in its memory.. 
(2-1) DD rIDHx  )(   
(2-2) ),( xeEa PP  
(2-3) ),( D
S rxEC   
(2-4) Send ))(,),(,( DrHCxHa  to the authentication server through the broker. 
Step 3 : The authentication server performs the following actions after receiving 
))(,),(,( DrHCxHa .  
(3-1) ),( adDx PP   
(3-2) ),( CxDr SD   
(3-3) Use )(xH  and )( DrH  to verify the accuracy of the x  and Dr . 
(3-4) DD rxIDH )(  
(3-5) DSig  derive the value of magnetic material at the base of the search key )( DIDH . 
Server will get identification of Security devices after the end of this step. 
Step 4: The authentication server performs the following behavior. 
(4-1) Generate new random number newr  that is different Dr  used by PRNG . 
(4-2) newD rIDHy  )(  
(4-3) ),( newD
S rIDEb  
(4-4) dkLen) c, , ,( PBKDF2 newD rIDk  
  Here, c is iteration count, a positive integer and dkLen is intended length in 
octets of the derived key, a length of data encrypt key in Mobile device. 
(4-5) ),( D
S SigkEg   
(4-6) Send )),(),(,( grHyHb new  to security device D  through the broker. 
Step 5: The security device D  performs the following actions after receiving 
)),(),(,( grHyHb new  
(5-1) ),( bIDDr D
S
new    
(5-2) Confirm the accuracy of the newr  used by the hash value )( newrH  
(5-3) Compare ))(( newD rIDHH   and the receipted hash value )(yH  
If the two values match, the security device will get the identification and 
Chol-Un Kim , Dok-Jun An and Song Han 
 
 
6 
 
reliability for newr , based on the (5-1). 
(5-4) dkLen) c, , ,( PBKDF2 newD rIDk  
(5-5) ),( gkDSig S  
(5-6) Compare DID  of Sig  and the DID of the security device. 
If the two values match, newr should be kept and data in the security device should 
be decrypt using key of Sig . 
 
 
4. Security Interpretations 
 
[Theorem 1] This Protocol ensures anonymity. 
(Proof) Message that is sent Security devices to the server, are included ))(,),(,( DrHCxHa . 
If you guarantee safety for PKE , the attacker can’t get accurate x , and because don’t know the 
encryption key that was used to encrypt the symmetric key, Ciphertext for decryption is impossible, 
therefore don't know Dr  . 
The attacker never knows )( DIDH . (End) 
 
[Theorem 2] These Protocol conventions prevent replay attacks. 
 (Proof) In the Protocol tags and serve are used temporary as a random number Dr  only for 
the duration of the conversation and it will be updated after successful authentication. 
Also because All Information of Conventions notice depend random number Dr , replay attacks 
is impossible. (End) 
 
[Theorem 3] This Protocol realizes the interactive identification between the security devices 
and the authentication server. 
(Proof) Because identify a number DID of physical security devices is known only self-security 
devices and authentication Server, in step3 (3-5) Server will confirm the identity of the security 
device, and in step 5(5-3) security device will confirm the identity of the server. (End) 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
1) The covenant presented in this paper are able to be used in one computer system security, 
remote user authentication and  Data Encrypt Key management, which are based on software 
security USB, RFID and etc. And, the protocol can be used to build a security system within the 
company through a mobile device such as USB.  
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2) The mobile devices does not contain any information that can help to get the data encryption 
key, so the data in the device is secure even if the attacker illegally owned mobile devices.  
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